2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

death, according to my informants, a brother or a son might succeed or the heritage be divided among several sons. This made for smaller and smaller subdivisions until they were presently welded again into one when a particular ruler gained supremacy over the others. The death of a khan was normally followed by a civil war, with the local leaders taking sides with one or the other claimant or cautiously remaining neutral until it became clear which was likely to emerge victorious.

There are references[34] to meetings or councils to settle questions of general policy for the khanate. Such gatherings, however, cannot be said to have been of a democratic nature; Levshin[35] describes them as composed of the chiefs, the great warriors, the rich and the elders, "avec des troupes de curieux." The right to participate in such councils was not clearly defined; those who considered themselves entitled to do so took part and their words bore weight according to their personal prestige. It does not appear that any decisions which might be arrived at were binding upon anyone. Grodekov[36] was told that the meetings "did not change their customs."

The loose nature of the bond between the khan and the local groups has been indicated above. It is very difficult to speak of centralized, or at least responsible, government during the greater part of Kazak history. The point which I wish to emphasize again, however, is the lack of correlation between the genealogical "tribal" groupings and the political unions. There is little evidence of any graded series of political subdivisions or hierarchy of officials. Reverting again to the diagram on page 20, the bij and aqsaqal of the Davlet group, for example, were not in any way subordinate to the bij and aqsaqal of the Esqoça group. The two groups were quite independent, united only in their common if tenuous allegiance to their particular khan. In any given case moreover such similarly related groups might be subject to two different khans.[37]

In practice, however, there were instances of something approaching a dependence of one local group upon another, when a new uru group was in the process of development. There were for example a few families from Davlet consisting of about thirty tents who formed a semi-detached unit by themselves. They had their own headman, also called aqsaqal, who regulated the affairs of his few families but was generally influenced and controlled by the bij and aqsaqal of Davlet. Such a situation could doubtless be duplicated frequently. All groups were of course not of the same size and the smaller and weaker sought protection from the stronger. As the smaller groups increased in size they became independent equals of the established units.

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question which of the Chingizids in one case or another had the best right to the throne, and whether the election of this or that khan was legally valid."

[34] Grodekov, *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*, 25; Levshin, *Description des hordes*, 397; Pallas, *Voyages*, 1: 621–22.

[35] *Description des hordes*, 397.

[36] *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*, 25.

[37] Here I am giving my own inferences from the general character of the information. The informants agreed that the above statement was true in principle but could furnish no concrete illustration. Kargabaiev was very uncertain about the larger political affiliations of his own group.

[152 cont.]

175 their wives and children. Finally, the fugutives halted, but in
[167 barren localities offering no support to a nomadic people. It
731] was impossible for the Kazaks to endure such an unhappy situation for long. Of the two scourges which menaced them, it was best to choose the one which promised some advantages, if not for the present at least for the future. Despair drove them to make themselves masters of their old territories, which they could not do without. Danger had snuffed out the flame of dissension and replaced it with unanimity of sentiment, and the efforts of all
[644] were directed to the same end. It was decided in a general assembly of the people to advance, attack the common enemies, and drive them from the lands of the Kazaks. This undertaking was sanctified at once by a common oath to remain faithful to
[643 each other. Khan Abulkhair was chosen as [153] leader of the
782] nation, and the sacrifice of a white horse (1), which was made

1. See the article on "Customs" in the statistical section of this book, for more details. [Not translated.]

according to the custom of this people, was considered a pledge of future peace.

[726] After these preparations the Kazaks advanced, attacked the Dzungas, and won a number of battles against them, and re-
[727] covered their old lands. But as they expected new attacks from Galdan Tsyren, they found it more opportune to move away from this dangerous neighbor, and some retreated to the north, while others moved westward. Only the Great Horde remained near the Dzungars, and they submitted to the latter almost in entirety, as we shall soon see. The Little Horde did not stop at the Emba
175 River, which was formerly the border, when they arrived there,
166 but crossed over to the right bank and attacked the Volga
726 Kalmuks, and after seizing a large part of their pasture lands, they moved all the way to the Ural River. The Middle Horde moved north to the Ori and the Ui, and drove out many Bashkirs from the vicinity of these rivers. Although the strength of the

[170 cont.]
cleverness triumphed over force.

Vexed by the presence of the Russians and fearing their influence, the Kazaks firmly resolved to rid themselves of these distasteful guests. For this reason they announced to Tevkelev that they were going to call a general assembly of the nation, at which they would definitively decide whether they would or would not swear the oath of allegiance to Russia, and that he himself should be present at the assembly without being accompanied by anyone. It was all but certain that they wished to assassinate him, and yet Tevkelev did not refuse this invitation and even knew how to turn it to his own advantage.

He knew the greediness of the Kazaks, and he was guided by the Khan and his partisans. He took care to secure himself by gifts to certain of his principal and most dangerous enemies, and next he appeared at the assembly. Emboldened by the hope of having defenders and seeing himself placed in a position where he must perish or distinguish himself, he showed all the firmness, eloquence, and presence of mind of which he had given so many indications to the Kazaks and which had yielded him the greatest consideration on the part of the Moslems. Bukenbai, a Kazak elder who was as eminent as he was respected in the Middle and the Little Hordes, was the first to proclaim himself his protector. Tevkelev,together with this elder and with Khan Abulkhair, who presided in person over this assembly, spoke with such force and authority in favor of Russia that the party which was opposed to the Khan was won over by the arguments of his partisans. The result was that all the persons in attendance, starting with Abulkhair and Shemiaka, khan of the Middle Horde, swore the oath of loyalty to Russia. All this took place in 1732. As he was far from the border, Tevkelev had not yet had time to inform the government of the success of his mission when violent disturbances took place in the Middle Horde.

At first the Khan and the tribal chiefs envied the [171] power which Abulkhair was to gain by his alliance with the court of Petersburg, and they even feared him. But the common people, among whom there were fewer partisans of Russia than in the Little Horde, did not wish to give up their independence. They saw

[235 cont.]

Khan of having secret relations with the Orenburg authorities. As a result, in order not to confirm the opinions of his subjects on this idea, he asked that when he was sent reprimands for them in letters coming from Orenburg, they be sent for him also. Concerning known brigands, he said he could make them known in secret but could not deliver them, leaving the power of sending troops against them to the Russian government.

As a result the government resolved to increase Nurali's power and at the same time to devise a plan for punishing the Kazaks in such a way that they would feel at least once the power and the force of the empire. An order had already been given to draw a detailed map of the western part of the Kazak steppe, and the best means were already being sought for carrying on a campaign beyond the Ural. Everything foretold a terrible calamity for the Little Horde (2), when the Seven Years War opened between

2. See the ukase of June 10, 1756.

Russia and Prussia, and it was averted.

Nevertheless there was a great national assembly in the Little Horde in 1756, no doubt with the aim of discussing ways of averting the danger menacing them, and it opposed not only the demand of the Khan and his brothers to return the Russian prisoners and the Bashkir deserters, [236] but also undertook to help them. The Sultans Erali and Aichuvak pursued the interests of Russia with great warmth on this occasion.

At the beginning of 1757, Dunduk Dashi, deputy of the khan of the Volga Kalmuks, warned the governor of Astrakhan that all the Kazaks were intending to enter the Turkish possessions on the Kuban and that they had already requested permission from the Ottoman Porte through an embassy sent for this purpose. This news was difficult to believe. Nevertheless prudence demanded

[272 cont.]

×648 No one stopped to reflect on the possibility or impossibility of carrying out this measure, because the Orenburg administration had proposed it itself and must have the means of accomplishing it.

[177] Having received the approbation of the court, Baron Igelstrom at once began to introduce the new order of things.

His first step produced results which were in perfect harmony ×648 with the end to which he aspired.

●646 Without the intermediary of the Khan, he sent solemn proclamations throughout the entire horde, in which, without speaking 728 668 of the Khan nor of the sultans, he invited the elders and the people 177 to form an assembly in order to come to an agreement on the means of maintaining order in the horde and living in obedience to the Russian government. He advised them to renounce brigandage and raids and to expect the pardon they deserved for their repentance or severe punishments for the crimes which had been disturbing public order. These proclamations almost completely destroyed the last vestiges of the weak power of the Khan. Many Kazaks who were followers of the Khan abandoned him and joined his enemies, and all together they formed a national assembly which did not contain one sultan, and where Batyr Syrym, of whom we have spoken, twice presided as chief.

×648 The confidence shown by the people in Syrym in this instance 646 is very common, and is in perfect harmony with the Kazak notions 728 of the greatness of spirit. But who would fail to be surprised at the consideration given in Orenburg to this [273] man who the year before had been the leader of a band of brigands, at whose head he had attacked Russian troops and forts?

All Syrym's actions showed that he was a man of vast intelligence but one unsatisfied, restless, and vindictive, and moreover, of an enterprising character rarely found among a half-savage people. After having distinguished himself among the bandits, he soon came to eminence in the council which had assembled to re-establish the general peace, as he believed that new and brilliant advantages lay in this for him. As he was an irreconcilable enemy of the Khan, not so much because of specific disputes with Nurali as of the longing he felt for the heriditary

[273 cont.]
privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government. But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand? Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weakness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace. Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted. Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment of calm within the horde.

[274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans, especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of [439] livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

1. See the table on the quantity of livestock exchanged by the Kazaks with the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we have included in the statistical article [pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

[283 cont.]

X 648 It was in 1790 that he began to give the strongest proofs of his hatred. But before describing them, we believe it our duty to recall certain regulations made by Empress Catherine for the good of the hordes during the period when the establishment of peace seemed possible there and even close at hand.

[431 423] On August 13, 1786, on the occasion of a demand for a concession of land made by Khudai Mendy, sultan of the Middle Horde, the border authorities were commanded not only to yield it to him as well as to his subjects, but also to give assistance in money as a pure gift to every family which wished to settle.

On July 15, 1788 it was permitted to give land to Kazaks who went into Russia without requiring any confirmation for this.

[871] On February 28, 1789 the staff of the Kazak schools on the Orenburg line were confirmed and the salaries of the teachers and the expense of feeding the students at the cost of the government were settled. It was further commanded that their fathers be given, as encouragement, certificates of praise, gifts, etc.

[42] On April 30, 1789 Baron Igelstrom received an order to compose a plan for a constitution for the Kazaks based on folk customs, habits, and oral laws.

X 648 668 Although Russia had already recognized the absolute necessity of re-establishing the position of khan in the Middle Horde, the khan had not yet been elected when Syrym broke every [284] kind of liaison with the governor of Orenburg and declared himself the foremost enemy of the Russians. Not satisfied with having aroused his compatriots and having attacked the inhabitants on the right bank of the Ural River, he sought help in Bukhara and sent agents into that land to this end in 1790. The Khan's atalyk replied that help would be sent, but after a certain time. Meanwhile he advised Syrym to continue his raids on the Russian border. One of the envoys who had received this reply in Bukhara was later taken prisoner by the Ural Cossacks and personally gave the most positive details about his embassy.

X 648 ● 674 721 In the month of March, 1791 Syrym, hoping to induce the entire Little Horde to invade Russia, convoked a great national assembly at the mouth of the Emba and had letters distributed everywhere to arouse the nation. This undertaking was not fully

[284 cont.]

X 648 successful, because the sultans, and especially the descendants of
● 646 Abulkhair, were trying to please the Russian government, having
721 been informed of the Empress' intentions to re-establish the post of khan among them. As for individual raids, Syrym's followers continued them almost without interruption for seven or eight years.

X 648 The main raids took place after the election of Sultan Erali
[726] to the position of khan, which was in 1791 by order of the Empress. When she learned of Nurali's death, she commanded on January 29
[683] that Erali be named his successor and that he be sent the patent of khan of the Little Horde without waiting for any representations. In carrying out the will of his sovereign, the commander of the province of Orenburg at once informed Abulkhair's son of the honor which was being given him and invited him to appear at the border at the end of summer to receive the ceremonial investiture. Erali arrived at the Ural at the designated time with his followers and on September 4 was proclaimed khan, 15 versts from the fortress of Orsk.

This is how his election took place. On the day at the hour designated, Lieutenant General Peutling, supreme commander of [285] the border region of Orenburg, escorted by a body of troops appeared before the assembled Kazaks and commanded first of all that the imperial document be read to them, in which it was said that Erali had been designated khan, both because of his personal merit and because he was the eldest in Abulkhair's family. Then he invited the people to proceed to the election according to its old customs.

At this same moment there appeared the deputies of Batyr Syrym, those of Sultan Abulgazy Kaip, and those of several elders, who announced that they did not consent to the election of Erali. They received the reply that he had been designated by the wish of the Empress. The next day, after the proclamation of the Khan, that is, September 5, six deputies were chosen who were sent to St. Petersburg to ask that he be confirmed.

On September 6 a letter was received from the khan of Turkestan, Pirali, son of Nurali, in which this prince, who had

[289 cont.]

[648] During the winter of 1797-98, a strong detachment of Ural Cossacks [726] crossed the Ural River and not only defeated the robbers but in exchange for the studs which had been taken from them in Russia, [727] they carried off several thousands of horses, which were distributed to those who had suffered losses. Shortly afterward they were attacked by the Bashkirs, who took 5,000 horses from them.

It can be imagined that the Kazaks did not leave these two losses unavenged. The result was new raids, new reprisals, and new insults from one side and the other. In order to put an end to these disturbances, commissions were established on the borders composed of deputies of the Bashkir, Kazak, and Kalmuk peoples, as well as the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks. These commissions were supposed to examine the complaints which came to them from all sides and to satisfy them as much as possible, as well as to try to suppress permanently demands which were unjust or impossible to satisfy.

[290] These commissions did not fulfill the object of their meeting, and indeed scarcely set about satisfying the duties imposed on them, for no one appeared at the tribunal.

[67] At this time many Kazaks from different hordes asked to establish themselves permanently in Russia. Their requests were answered in an ukase of September 30, 1797, as a consequence of which 12,000 tents of the Middle Horde alone are settled down in various localities to this day.

[646] After Ishim's death the government of the Little Horde was entrusted to a council composed of Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair, as president, and six councilors, two from each tribe. They were all chosen by Baron Igelstrom, who was then commanding the Orenburg border area for the second time and had once [643] again given the government the idea of maintaining the Kazaks without the intermediary of a khan. When Emperor Paul had sent a confirmation of his demands, he chose the Khobda River as the [646] permanent residence of the council and had it opened in this region by the mufti Mohammed Djan Hussein, who was sent from Orenburg in 1797. The councilors took an oath of loyalty and swore to carry out their duties zealously, and the mufti remained with them

[290 cont.]
for some time to observe their conduct. His supervision soon became useless, because the nomads did not wish to have a council, did not turn to it in their affairs, and asked for a khan.

In order to comply with their wishes, that same year it was ordered to proceed with the election of a successor to Ishim. Most of the horde wanted to elect Sultan Karatai, son of Nurali, but his devotion to Russia was doubtful. Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair and uncle of Karatai, who had presided over the council, inspired much more confidence in the government and had much more right to this honor. In October, 1797 the Kazaks assembled near the [291] border proclaimed him, and the following year Emperor Paul confirmed him, as the chief of the entire Little Horde. The council which had been formed to govern the Little Horde after Ishim's death was ordered to remain constantly by Khan Aichuvak and was called the council of the khan.

It can be seen by the Orenburg archives that Aichuvak had often distinguished himself, not only by his attachment to Russia but also by his influence over the Kazaks while they were ruled by Nurali. Thus his elevation to the rank of khan seemed to promise various advantages. However, what followed did not justify this hope. Being burdened with age, the Khan could not act as he had earlier and was nothing more than a very weak leader. The internal disputes, the Buruts, the pillaging of caravans, the raids on the Russian frontier, especially against the Bashkirs, the acts of vengeance which were taken after these, the investigations and the punishments caused a terrible confusion in the Little Horde. The commissions formed of deputies from the different peoples, which we described above, could not act, and it was decided to dissolve them. The Khan did not have enough power to punish the guilty or to protect the oppressed. The disorder and anarchy which had more or less always prevailed among the Kazaks increased from one day to the next, and finally the dissensions spread everywhere.

These circumstances produced very important consequences. Many of the Kazaks who were nomadizing near the Ural River withdrew to the far end of the steppes and refused to obey the descendants of Abulkhair. Some of them fused with several

[291 cont.]
descent lines of the Middle Horde and chose to live much farther to the east than the former. Others withdrew to the mouth of the Syr[Darya], and after overthrowing the Karakalpaks, they chose Sultan Abulgazi Kaip as khan.

A third group attacked the Turkmen, and after forcing them to give up part of their lands, they occupied a large part of the isthmus which separates the Aral Sea from the Caspian Sea. Aichuvak himself and several sultans with [292] him were obliged to cross the Ural River to save their lives and to remain in Russia until this general fermentation was calmed.

Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, who had had the place of president in the council of the khan, did the same, but he followed a different course. He lived near the border of the government of Astrakhan, and knowing that after the departure of the Kalmuks, many lands had remained deserted which were suitable for pasturage, he decided in 1799 to leave forever the steppes beyond the Ural River and to go over into the territory called Ryn Peski. Having decided thus and hoping to become an independent khan soon, Bukei addressed himself to General Knorring, the governor general of Georgia and Astrakhan, begging for permission to occupy the lands he had chosen between the Ural and the Volga and the freedom to transport there the Kazaks in his auls, while assigning him 100 Cossacks with their officers in order to maintain order.

It was impossible to neglect a proposal which was so advantageous and so useful. Governor Knorring brought it to the attention of Emperor Paul, who, by an ukase of March 11, 1801, commanded that it be put into execution.

Without losing time, Bukei prepared to move into Russia about the autumn of that same year. The Kazaks who followed him belonged mostly to the Baiulin descent line. There were few of the Alimul line and almost none from that of the Semirod. All of them together comprised about 10,000 tents. Once they had occupied the Ryn Peski, they promptly became a clear and striking demonstration of the effects of a peaceful life. While their compatriots beyond the Ural River, ruined and exhausted by their